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1731 
PROTECTING DEFENSE CONTRACTING WITH 
A PURPOSE: INTERPRETING CIVIL LIABILITY 
UNDER THE ANTI-KICKBACK ACT 
Abstract: The Department of Defense awards over $600 billion in government de-
fense contracts to private contractors every year. The magnitude of these awards 
and the structure of defense contracts place the government at serious risk if fraud 
and misrepresentation are not adequately regulated and prosecuted. The Anti-
Kickback Act of 1986 seeks to protect the government from fraud by imposing 
damages on prime contractors that either accept kickbacks or include the cost of 
kickbacks in their contract prices. The Act’s civil liability provision provides for di-
rect and vicarious liability against prime contractor corporations whose employees 
or subcontractors engage in kickback activity. Recently, conflicting interpretations 
have surfaced regarding the extent of vicarious liability damages under the Act’s 
civil liability provision. This Note argues that the textual ambiguity and inconclu-
sive legislative history surrounding the civil liability provision require that the pro-
vision be interpreted and applied in light of the Act’s purpose and goals. Accord-
ingly, this Note argues that the civil liability provision should be interpreted to limit 
vicarious liability damages against prime contractor corporations. This interpreta-
tion satisfies the Act’s purpose and goals and avoids the substantial risks created by 
expanding vicarious liability damages. Most significantly, limiting vicarious liabil-
ity damages appropriately protects the government’s interest, maintains the role of 
prime contractor corporations, and preserves the market for government defense 
contracts.  
INTRODUCTION 
On September 30, 2014, the Department of Defense awarded over $2.5 bil-
lion in defense contracts to private contractors.1 Awards of this magnitude occur 
daily, placing the federal government at serious risk if fraud and misrepresenta-
tion are not closely regulated and prosecuted.2 The Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (“DCAA”) serves as the entity charged with auditing government de-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Contracts for Tuesday, September 30, 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Sept. 30, 2014), http://
www.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5387, archived at http://perma.cc/6UD9-
QYRX. 
 2 See id. Furthermore, given the cost and efficiency concerns of such extensive regulatory 
schemes, it is crucial that the government have recourse in the event that fraud and misrepresentation 
occur. See INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, at iii, 94 
(2014), available at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/sar/SAR_MAR_2014_FINAL_compliant.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/4DQV-AAL2 (disclosing that, between October 1, 2013, and March 31, 
2014, the Office of the Inspector General issued 83 reports of misconduct and identified $23.5 billion 
in potential monetary losses to the government as a result of that misconduct). 
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fense contracts and investigating fraud in the contracting and bidding process.3 
When the DCAA identifies fraud or misrepresentation on a defense contract, the 
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) then has the power to pursue civil and crim-
inal actions against the government contractor.4 
Fraud in federal defense contracting can occur either when bribes are paid 
directly to the government or when kickbacks are given to contractors to induce 
favorable subcontract treatment.5 The first form of fraud involves payments made 
to employees or officials of the government to induce favorable government 
treatment.6 The second form involves bribes given to any prime contractor that 
has a contractual relationship with the government.7 The DOJ prosecutes private 
contractors involved in this second form of fraud under the Anti-Kickback Act of 
1986 (“Anti-Kickback Act”).8 The Anti-Kickback Act imposes penalties on 
prime contractors when they solicit or accept kickbacks on government contracts, 
or when they include the cost of kickbacks in their contract prices.9  
                                                                                                                           
 3 DEF. CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY, 2013 YEAR IN REVIEW 13 (2014), available at http://www.
dcaa.mil/publications/DCAA_2013_Year_in_Review.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D5M5-G6TB. 
The DCAA conducts a range of audits including pre-award contract audits, post-award contract audits, 
business system audits, and negotiation assistance audits. Id. In its 2013 annual report, the DCAA 
announced that it examined $160 billion in contract costs, resulting in $4.4 billion in net savings to the 
government. Id. These net savings correspond to a return on taxpayer investment of approximately 
$7.30 per dollar invested. Id.  
 4 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3731 (2012); 41 U.S.C. §§ 8701–8706 (2012) 
(formerly codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 52–58 (2006)). To prosecute defense contract fraud, the DOJ pri-
marily uses the federal anti-bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3729–3731, and the Anti-Kickback Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 8701–8706. 
 5 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (making it unlawful to corruptly give, offer, or promise anything of value 
to any public official or person who has been selected to be a public official); 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (mak-
ing it unlawful to present a false or fraudulent claim for payment from the government); 41 U.S.C. 
§ 8702 (making it unlawful to provide, offer, solicit, or accept a kickback or include a kickback in a 
contract price). 
 6 See 18 U.S.C. § 201; United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 341–55 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirm-
ing the conviction of a Louisiana congressman for multiple bribery and fraud schemes in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 201); United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1075–77 (10th Cir. 1980) (affirming a 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 201 for bribing a Federal Aviation Administration procurement agent).  
 7 See 41 U.S.C. §§ 8701–8706. Although recent cases sometimes refer to the Anti-Kickback Act 
under its original codification, 41 U.S.C. §§ 52–58, this Note refers to the current codification under 
Sections 8701–8706 of Title 41 of the United States Code. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 52–58 (2006); 41 U.S.C. 
§§ 8701–8706 (2012). 
 8 See 41 U.S.C. §§ 8701–8706; United States v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 976–78 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(using the Anti-Kickback Act to prosecute kickbacks from shipping subcontractors); United States v. 
Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (E.D. Va. 2000) (using the Anti-Kickback Act to prosecute kick-
backs used to ensure the continued awarding of subcontracts).  
 9 41 U.S.C. § 8701(4)–(5). The Anti-Kickback Act defines a “prime contractor” as anyone who 
enters into a contract or contractual action with the federal government to obtain supplies, materials, 
equipment, or services of any kind. Id. Prime contractors are liable for kickbacks under the civil liabil-
ity provision and the criminal penalties provision of the Act. Id. §§ 8706–8707. “Kickbacks” are de-
fined to include compensation of any kind provided “to improperly obtain or reward favorable treat-
ment in connection with a prime contract or a subcontract relating to a prime contract.” Id. § 8701(2).  
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Originally enacted in 1946 in response to reports of kickbacks during 
World War II, the Anti-Kickback Act was amended forty years later to reflect the 
increasingly large volume of government defense contracts.10 The amended An-
ti-Kickback Act expounds three main goals in seeking to protect the govern-
ment’s interest and the role of prime contractors.11 First, the Act aims to deter 
prime contractors from overcharging the government as a result of kickbacks 
and to compensate the government in the event of a kickback.12 Second, the Act 
attempts to maintain market efficiency by ensuring that prime contractors enter 
into subcontracts on the basis of expertise and cost-efficiency.13 Finally, the Act 
                                                                                                                           
10 See Act of Mar. 8, 1946, ch. 80, 60 Stat. 37 (formerly codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 52–58 (2006)); 
Anti-Kickback Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-634, § 2(a), 100 Stat. 3523 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. 
§§ 8701–8706) (amending the original Act). The Anti-Kickback Act was originally enacted in 1946 in 
response to reports that a significant number of large defense subcontractors had provided kickbacks 
to prime contractors to gain valuable military subcontracts during World War II. See 60 Stat. 37; Unit-
ed States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. (KBR II), 727 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(explaining the influx of kickbacks that led to the original Act’s enactment). The Anti-Kickback Act 
was amended in 1986 to address efficiency concerns in light of the increasingly large volume of gov-
ernment defense contracts. See Pub. L. 99-634, § 2(a), 100 Stat. 3523; H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 3–4 
(1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5960–61. In a statement given to the Legislation and 
National Security Committee, Congressman Bryant described the original statute as being “full of 
loopholes, limitations and relics of a bygone contracting era that have not kept pace with changes in 
contracting practices.” Id. at 8, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5967. Although U.S. defense spending has sig-
nificantly dropped since the post-WWII era, it still accounted for $619 billion in 2013. DINAH WALK-
ER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TRENDS IN U.S. MILITARY SPENDING 1 (2014), available at 
http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Trends%20in%20US%20Military%20Spending%
202014_final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5SLE-V39V. Given the level of defense spending in the 
United States, there is a large incentive for subcontractors to provide kickbacks to obtain these lucra-
tive contracts from prime contractors. See id. To account for these perverse incentives, the amended 
Act includes heightened regulatory requirements and procedures for prime contractors. 41 U.S.C. 
§ 8703(a)–(c). The Anti-Kickback Act imposes (a) requirements included in contracts, (b) full cooper-
ation requirements, and (c) reporting requirements on prime contractors that obtain defense contracts 
with the United States. See id. These requirements apply to all contracts that exceed $100,000 in val-
ue. Id. § 8703(d). Specifically, prime contractors must implement internal procedures to monitor and 
prevent kickbacks and comply with all government kickback investigations. Id. § 8703(a)–(b). Fur-
thermore, prime contractors are required to report any suspected kickbacks to the government. Id. 
§ 8703(c). Along with these heightened regulatory responsibilities, prime contractors can also be sub-
ject to civil liability if their employee, a subcontractor, or a subcontractor’s employee offers, solicits, 
or accepts a kickback on a government defense contract. Id. § 8706(a). 
 11 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 4–5, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960–62. 
 12 See id. (explaining that increased deterrence and compensation are necessary to combat the 
enormous magnitude of kickbacks included in government contract prices); see also United States v. 
Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 54–57 (1989) (overcharging the government by applying over-budget costs 
from one contract to another under-budget contract); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 
537, 541–43 (1943) (overcharging the government through collusive bidding); United States v. Sys. 
Architects, Inc., 757 F.2d 373, 374–76 (1st Cir. 1985) (overcharging the government by shifting costs 
between projects); Allyson Dunn, Government Contract Fraud, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603, 607–08 
(1987) (collecting sources). 
 13 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 4–5, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960–62 (describing how kickbacks 
and inefficient subcontractor selection can greatly harm the defense contract market). 
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is designed to create a regulatory structure that will impose appropriate levels of 
risk on prime contractors.14 
Recent debate concerning civil liability under the Anti-Kickback Act has 
exposed a challenge to the Act’s ability to achieve its intended goals.15 Despite 
the longstanding majority view that the Act limits prime contractor vicarious 
liability, at least one court has recently taken a different approach and substan-
tially broadened vicarious liability for prime contractors.16 This Note argues that 
because established methods of statutory interpretation do not uncover a pre-
ferred interpretation, the statute should be interpreted in light of its purpose and 
purported goals.17 Part I presents the civil liability provision of the Anti-
Kickback Act and the conflicting interpretations of prime contractor vicarious 
liability.18 Part II examines the text and legislative history of the civil liability 
provision and concludes that the provision should be interpreted and applied in 
light of the Act’s stated purpose and goals.19 Finally, Part III investigates the 
three main goals of the Act and argues that the provision should limit prime con-
tractor vicarious liability to avoid creating substantial risks and undermining the 
purpose of the statute.20  
I. INTERPRETIVE DEBATE: THE ANTI-KICKBACK ACT’S  
CIVIL LIABILITY PROVISION 
The Anti-Kickback Act’s amended civil liability provision serves as one of 
the DOJ’s primary sources of recourse against prime contractors.21 The civil lia-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See id. (discussing the need for a regulatory regime that imposes risks on prime contractors 
without making government defense contracts unprofitable through the imposition of an excessive 
risk of increased liability costs). 
 15 Compare KBR II, 727 F.3d at 347–49 (making available a recovery of damages equal to double 
the amount of the kickback plus additional penalties for reoccurrence), with H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 
4–5, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960–62 (explaining that, although the Anti-Kickback Act aims to ade-
quately compensate the government, it is important to avoid placing a disproportionate risk on prime 
contractors by applying excessive damages). 
 16 See KBR II, 727 F.3d at 347–49 (overturning the district court and departing from the 
longstanding tradition of reading Section 8706(a) of the Anti-Kickback Act as providing a limited 
vicarious liability remedy). 
 17 See infra notes 97–165 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 4–5 (1986), 
as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960–62 (listing the stated purpose and goals of the Anti-
Kickback Act). 
 18 See infra notes 21–66 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra note 67–96 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra note 97–165 and accompanying text. 
 21 41 U.S.C. § 8706 (2012). The Anti-Kickback Act’s civil liability provision reads as follows: 
(a) Amount.—The Federal Government in a civil action may recover from a person— 
(1) that knowingly engages in conduct prohibited by section 8702 of this title a civil 
penalty equal to— 
(A) twice the amount of each kickback involved in the violation; and 
(B) not more than $10,000 for each occurrence of prohibited conduct; and 
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bility provision is a key component in successful defense contract fraud prosecu-
tions because it imposes vicarious liability on prime contractors.22 The extent of 
available vicarious liability damages now turns on conflicting interpretations of 
that provision.23 This Part presents the conflicting interpretations of vicarious 
liability under the civil liability provision.24 First, Section A presents the expand-
ed coverage and sanctions available under the current version of the civil liabil-
ity provision.25 Then, Section B presents the conflicting interpretations of vicari-
ous liability damages under the civil liability provision.26 
A. Section 8706: The Anti-Kickback Act’s Civil Liability Provision 
The Anti-Kickback Act’s civil liability provision is designed to prevent 
prime contractors from accepting kickbacks when entering into subcontracts un-
der government defense contracts.27 The original 1946 version of the Anti-
Kickback Act provided the government with limited civil remedies, allowing 
damages only in the amount of the kickback and only from the individual that 
gave or received the kickback.28 The original Act thus had little impact on dis-
                                                                                                                           
(2) whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee violates section 8702 
of this title by providing, accepting, or charging a kickback a civil penalty equal to the 
amount of that kickback. 
Id. 
 22 Id. (expanding the coverage of the Anti-Kickback Act of 1946 to allow for vicarious liability 
damages in civil liability prosecutions). 
 23 Compare KBR II, 727 F.3d at 347–48 (interpreting the civil liability provision to allow for 
vicarious liability damages in excess of the amount of the kickback), with Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 
414 (limiting vicarious liability under the civil liability provision to the amount of the kickback). 
 24 See infra notes 27–66 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 27–38 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 39–66 and accompanying text. 
 27 See 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a); H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 4–7 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5960–64 (explaining that kickbacks are made to improperly induce or reward a 
variety of contract-related actions, including the award of a subcontract, disqualification of other 
competitive bids, acceptance of inferior products, or the modification of the contract). When a prime 
contractor enters into a contract with the federal government, that prime contractor is often entitled to 
enter into subcontracts and include those costs into its contract with the government. See Guide to 
DoD Contracting Opportunities: A Step by Step Approach to the DoD Marketplace, DEF. PROCURE-
MENT & ACQUISITION POLICY 3–4 (June 2, 2014), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/cp/docs/
Doing_Business_with_DoD_(2Jun14).pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KZD2-JS97. The civil liability 
provision of the Anti-Kickback Act is aimed at prohibiting the prime contractor, or its employees, 
from accepting kickbacks in those subcontracts. 41 U.S.C. § 8706. 
 28 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 7–9, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960–64 (explaining that the original 
Act was deficient and needed to be amended to expand the coverage, increase sanctions, and allow for 
vicarious liability). Under the regulatory scheme of the original Act, prime contractors were protected 
from liability so long as the prime contractor did not accept the kickback in its individual capacity. See 
W.J. Kelly, The Administrative Recovery of Kickbacks—A Modest Suggestion, 6 A.F. L. REV. 35, 36 
(1964) (explaining the process of recovering kickbacks prior to the 1986 amendments). As a result, 
prime contractors and subcontractors began utilizing more elaborate kickback schemes, rendering the 
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couraging kickbacks and the overpricing of government defense contracts.29 As 
a result, kickbacks under the original Act increased government contract prices 
by as much as fifteen percent, costing the government an additional $10 billion 
annually.30  
In response to the insufficient recoveries available under the original Act, 
the Anti-Kickback Act’s current civil liability provision includes vicarious liabil-
ity for prime contractors.31 Additionally, the current civil liability provision now 
allows for increased damages in certain circumstances.32 The inclusion of vicari-
ous liability and increased damages aims to protect the government’s interest and 
to further the Act’s purported purpose and goals.33  
The Anti-Kickback Act of 1986 functions to accomplish three main goals.34 
First, the Act aims to deter prime contractors from overcharging the government 
as a result of kickbacks and to compensate the government in the event of a 
kickback.35 Second, the Act attempts to maintain market efficiency by ensuring 
that prime contractors enter into subcontracts on the basis of expertise and cost-
efficiency.36 Finally, the Act is designed to create a regulatory structure that will 
impose appropriate levels of risk on prime contractors.37 Although an improve-
                                                                                                                           
Act’s prosecutorial mechanisms insufficient and antiquated. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 8, 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5965. 
 29 See, e.g., United States v. Gemmell, 160 F. Supp. 792, 794 (E.D. Penn. 1958) (explaining how 
a subcontractor paid a percentage of all subcontracts directly to prime contractor); United States v. 
Davio, 136 F. Supp. 423, 426–27 (E.D. Mich. 1955) (detailing how the supervisor of a large prime 
contractor entered into elaborate profit-sharing relationship with a subcontractor while fulfilling a 
prime contract with the United States Army Air Force). 
 30 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 19, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5976 (summarizing congressional 
testimony prior to the enactment of the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986). 
 31 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a); see H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 9–10, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5966–67 (de-
scribing the inadequacy and outdated nature of the remedies available under the original Anti-
Kickback Act). 
 32 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) (allowing for increased damages against any person that knowingly 
violates the Act). These increased damages equal double the amount of the kickback plus penalties for 
multiple violations of the Act. Id. The penalty for multiple violations of the Act is currently set at not 
more than $11,000 for each occurrence of prohibited conduct. Id. The amount of the penalty was orig-
inally set at $10,000 but was subsequently increased by the DOJ under the Federal Civil Monetary 
Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990. See 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(13) 
(2014). 
 33 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 4–7 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960–64. 
 34 See id. 
 35 See id. at 4–5, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960–62; see also Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. at 54–57 (ap-
plying over-budget costs); Hess, 317 U.S. at 541–43 (engaging in collusive bidding); Sys. Architects, 
Inc., 757 F.2d at 374–76 (shifting costs between projects); Dunn, supra note 12 at 607–08 (collecting 
sources).  
 36 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 4–5, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960–62. 
 37 See id. (exploring the balance of risks of under-compensation against the risks of imposing 
excessive costs on prime contractors). 
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ment from the original Act, the current civil liability provision stills engenders 
criticism and controversy.38 
B. Conflicting Interpretations of Prime Contractor Vicarious Liability 
The extent of vicarious liability under the civil liability provision has re-
cently become subject to differing interpretations.39 The two prevailing interpre-
tations conflict as to whether prime contractor corporations can be subject to 
increased damages under Section 8706(a)(1) when their employees accept kick-
backs.40 The ultimate interpretation of the provision will have a significant im-
pact on both the government and prime contractors.41 Defense contracts are of-
ten structured on an ongoing basis, resulting in the potential for recurring kick-
backs under a single contract.42 With the scope of defense contracts exceeding 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See KBR II, 727 F.3d at 347–49 (exploring the application of vicarious liability under the civil 
liability provision twenty-seven years after the provision’s enactment).  
 39 Compare id. at 348–49 (limiting the liability of prime contractors to the amount of the kickback 
offered, irrespective of the total loss incurred by the government), with Morse Diesel Int’l, Inc. v. 
United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 116, 122 (2007) (discussing the possibility of increased damages in certain 
circumstances to compensate the government for the cost of the kickback actually incurred). 
 40 See KBR II, 727 F.3d at 343; Morse Diesel Int’l, Inc., 79 Fed. Cl. at 122. The two interpreta-
tions do not conflict as to whether Section 8706(a)(1) direct liability can be imposed on a prime con-
tractor when it accepts a kickback in its corporate capacity and retains the value of the kickback in its 
corporate coffers. See United States v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 1998) (explaining that 
prime contractor corporations are subject to greater damages when accepting kickbacks in their corpo-
rate capacity). 
 41 WALKER, supra note 10, at 1. U.S. defense spending accounted for $619 billion of the federal 
budget in 2013. See id. Given that kickbacks are estimated to raise prices on contracts by between two 
to fifteen percent, the annual value of those kickbacks, which translates to both the loss to the gov-
ernment and the amount of the liability to contractors, is extreme. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 19 
(1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5976. 
 42 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 1 (providing examples of long-term, recurring defense 
contract awards). The structure of these contracts can take a variety of forms. See id. Under a fixed-
price with economic-price-adjustment format, a contract price is set but that price can later be adjusted 
upon the occurrence of specified contingencies. See id. (awarding a $325 million fixed-price with 
economic-price-adjustment contract to U.S. Food Raleigh Division). Under a firm-fixed-price indefi-
nite delivery contract, the contract price is set but the government can seek delivery of supplies at 
minimum intervals. See id. (awarding DHS Systems with a $200 million firm-fixed-price indefinite 
delivery contract to furnish various types of cold shelters). Under a maximum modification format 
contract, a firm contract price is set with limits on price increase adjustments based on services ren-
dered. See id. (awarding American Water Operations & Management, Inc. with a $13.4 million max-
imum-modification format contract to operate and maintain a wastewater system). The ongoing nature 
of these contracts may result in extensive kickback schemes. See, e.g., United States v. Purdy, 144 
F.3d 241, 243 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining how the president and CEO of a company paid tens of thou-
sands of dollars over the course of at least seven purchase orders related to government defense con-
tracts); Moore v. United States, 347 F.2d 942, 943 (9th Cir. 1965) (discussing how appellant was 
convicted of receiving payments to at least two businesses over an extended period of time); Jensen v. 
United States, 326 F.2d 891, 892 (9th Cir. 1964) (describing a kickback scheme involving at least 
eight individuals). 
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$600 billion annually, kickbacks under individual contracts can be substantial.43 
Given the magnitude of kickbacks, the measure of available vicarious liability 
damages has significant implications for the government and prime contrac-
tors.44  
Before evaluating the merits of each interpretation, it is important to under-
stand the formulation and reasoning behind each interpretation.45 First, Subsec-
tion 1 introduces the interpretation that vicarious liability damages are limited 
under the civil liability provision.46 Next, Subsection 2 introduces the interpreta-
tion that increased damages are available in vicarious liability cases.47 
1. Limited Vicarious Liability Interpretation 
The first interpretation states that prime contractors, in their corporate ca-
pacity, can be held vicariously liable for the kickbacks received by their employ-
ees only under Section 8706(a)(2), and only up to the value of the kickback.48 
This interpretation claims that the structure of the civil liability provision allows 
for two distinct and separate causes of action.49 The first cause of action, under 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig, Murtha-favored Contractors to Plead Guilty to Defrauding De-
fense Department, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/murtha-
favored-contractors-to-plead-guilty-to-defrauding-defense-department/2013/04/10/735c8482-a202-
11e2-be47-b44febada3a8_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D8YC-38Q3 (describing a kickback 
scheme in which Kuchera Defense Systems provided multiple kickbacks ranging in value from 
$200,000 to $650,000 to win U.S. Air Force communication system contracts); Press Release, U.S. 
Attorney’s Office: District of New Mexico, Former Officer of New Mexico-Based Defense Contractor 
Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy, Kickback and Tax Evasion Charges Related to Rebuilding Efforts in Iraq 
(July 9, 2013), available at http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/IGInformationReleases/BCPR.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/YPL4-7NC3 (announcing a conviction for a kickback scheme in which the 
defendant received $360,000 in monetary kickbacks, two valuable sports cars, and several wrist 
watches as kickbacks from foreign nationals during rebuilding efforts in Iraq). 
 44 See DEF. CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY, supra note 3, at 13 (announcing that in 2013, the DCAA 
examined $160 billion in contract costs, resulting in $4.4 billion in net savings to the government).  
 45 See infra notes 48–66 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 56–66 and accompanying text. 
 48 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(2) (2012) (allowing the government to recover a civil penalty equal to the 
amount of the kickback from a person whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee 
violates Section 8702 by providing, accepting, or charging a kickback); see, e.g., United States v. 
Grossman, 400 F.2d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1968) (describing a prime contractor employee who received 
gifts from a subcontractor that admittedly caused him to favor them in the award of purchase orders 
and subcontracts); Travers v. United States, 361 F.2d 753, 755 (1st Cir. 1966) (explaining how an 
officer of a subcontractor paid a fee or gratuity to the purchasing agent of the prime contractor in order 
to induce the award of subcontracts); Howard v. United States, 345 F.2d 126, 127–28 (1st Cir. 1965) 
(affirming the conviction of a general manager of a subcontractor who knowingly caused the subcon-
tractor to furnish labor and materials to a prime contractor for use in building his personal home to 
induce awards of subcontracts and orders). 
 49 See, e.g., Lippert, 148 F.3d at 977 (explaining that absolute vicarious liability applies only in a 
single civil penalty); Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 414 (limiting liability for the corporation to the amount 
of the kickback). 
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Section 8706(a)(1), imposes direct liability and prosecutes those persons that 
actually give or receive kickbacks.50 Under this cause of action the government 
is able to recover increased damages.51 The second cause of action, under Sec-
tion 8706(a)(2), imposes no-fault vicarious liability and prosecutes corporations 
for the acts of their employees, subcontractors, or subcontractor employees.52 
Under this cause of action the government is able to recover damages only up to 
the amount of the kickback.53 This interpretation posits that because the second 
cause of action specifically creates vicarious liability for prime contractors, the 
first cause of action must not be applied to vicarious liability cases.54 Such an 
application would render the second cause of action superfluous, as the govern-
ment would always seek increased damages in vicarious liability cases.55 
2. Increased Vicarious Liability Interpretation 
The second interpretation, recently adopted by the Fifth Circuit in a case of 
first impression, states that the government can seek increased damages in vicar-
ious liability cases.56 In 2013, in United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & 
Root, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that prime con-
tractors are subject to increased damages for vicarious liability under Section 
8706(a)(1).57 This interpretation discounts the contention that allowing vicarious 
liability under Section 8706(a)(1) would render Section 8706(a)(2) superflu-
ous.58 Rather, this interpretation argues that the civil liability provision provides 
                                                                                                                           
 50 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) (allowing the government to recover increased damages from a person 
that knowingly engages in prohibited conduct).  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. § 8706(a)(2). 
 53 Id. 
 54 See id. § 8706(a)(1)–(2) (2012); United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. 
(KBR I), 903 F. Supp. 2d 473, 490–91 (E.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d and remanded, KBR II, 727 F.3d 343 
(5th Cir. 2013) (finding that Congress’s attempt to impose vicarious liability under the Anti-Kickback 
Act was evidenced only by the no-fault vicarious liability created under Section 8706(a)(2)). Accord-
ing to the district court in United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., imposing vicari-
ous liability on contractors under the first cause of action would overreach beyond the intent of Con-
gress. See id. 
 55 See Kornman & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 451 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining 
that a court may deviate from the literal language of a statute only if the plain language would render 
the statute illogical and inconsistent with the intent of Congress). Because the statute can be logically 
applied according to its plain language, the court must not adopt an alternative interpretation. See KBR 
I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 490–91. Furthermore, adopting an alternative interpretation could be even more 
inconsistent with the intent of Congress. See id. 
 56 KBR II, 727 F.3d at 347–48 (rejecting the District Court’s interpretation of the statute and hold-
ing that the statutory language of Section 8706(a) allows vicarious liability across both subsections of 
the civil liability provision). 
 57 See id. 
 58 Compare id. (serving as the first United States Court of Appeals to directly address the issue 
and holding contrary to the common understanding of the provision), with KBR I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 
490–91 (limiting vicarious liability damages to Section 8706(a)(2) of the Anti-Kickback Act). 
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two distinct causes of action in vicarious liability cases: one for “knowing[]” 
violations of the Act and one for unknowing violations.59 Thus, this interpreta-
tion makes increased damages available in vicarious liability cases where the 
prime contractor knowingly engages in kickback activity.60 
This interpretation places significant importance on the meaning of a 
“knowing” violation by a prime contractor.61 Although the Fifth Circuit avoided 
exploring the difference between knowing and unknowing violations, under-
standing the distinction is crucial in determining the most appropriate interpreta-
tion of the statute.62 
It is well established that because corporations are legal entities incapable 
of having a mental state, any “knowledge” must be imputed from some natural 
person.63 Furthermore, the knowledge of all individuals working for or on behalf 
of a corporation is certainly not imputed to the corporation; rather, an individu-
al’s knowledge is only imputed when warranted by the individual’s level of re-
sponsibility, authority, or managerial role in the corporation.64 Whether an em-
ployee’s knowledge can be imputed requires a factual determination about the 
individual’s level of responsibility and authority based on the particular circum-
stances of the individual’s employment.65 Consequently, this interpretation by 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See KBR II, 727 F.3d at 347–48. 
 60 See id. Both interpretations correctly recognize that the Anti-Kickback Act defines “person” to 
include corporations, partnerships, business associations of any kind, trusts, joint-stock companies, 
and individuals. 41 U.S.C. § 8701(3) (2012).  
 61 See 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1)–(2). Recall that this interpretation relies on the knowledge distinc-
tion to separate causes of action for increased damages under Section 8706(a)(1) from causes of action 
for the amount of the kickback under Section 8706(a)(2). See id.; KBR II, 727 F.3d at 347–48; see 
also United States v. Vargas-Duran, 356 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that rules of statu-
tory interpretation require that, when possible, a court should “give each word in a statute operative 
effect” to ensure that no words are rendered superfluous). 
 62 See KBR II, 727 F.3d at 347–48. Although the majority opinion refused to address the issue, as 
it was not squarely before the court, the concurrence did make an effort to explain the “knowing” 
distinction. Id. at 354–56 (Jolly, J., concurring). 
 63 See KBR II, 727 F.3d at 348; see also F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 
1992) (explaining that because corporations operate through individuals, the privity and knowledge of 
the corporation must at some point come from the privity and knowledge of an individual); 10 WIL-
LIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4877 
(2012 ed.) (summarizing the general principles of vicarious liability). 
 64 See 3 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 63, § 807 (explaining that the knowledge of a mere em-
ployee for a corporation ordinarily is not imputed to the company); see also Kellogg Brown & Root 
Servs., Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 714, 773–74 (2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 728 F.3d 
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding that two mid-level managers had insufficient authority to have their 
knowledge imputed to the corporation); Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 171 (explaining that although the 
individual need not necessarily be an officer or director, whether or not knowledge can be imputed to 
the corporation depends on the individual’s level of responsibility). Courts generally agree that the 
knowledge of directors or key officers can be imputed to the corporation, but whether an employee’s 
knowledge can be imputed requires a case-by-case analysis. See Cont’l Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706 
F.2d 1365, 1376 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining that an individual’s level of responsibility within a corpo-
ration must be discerned from the circumstances of the particular case).  
 65 See 3 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 63, § 807. 
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the Fifth Circuit necessarily allows for increased damages in vicarious liability 
cases when a person with knowledge imputable to the prime contractor corpora-
tion gives or receives a kickback.66  
II. INTERPRETING THE CIVIL LIABILITY PROVISION:  
TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
An examination of the civil liability provision under the canons of statutory 
interpretation is required to determine which interpretation of the Anti-Kickback 
Act of 1986 (“Anti-Kickback Act”) is best.67 First, Section A examines the plain 
text and structure of the provision.68 Next, Section B investigates the Anti-Kick-
back Act’s legislative history.69 Section B also concludes that, given the ambi-
guity of the text and the lack of legislative guidance, the Anti-Kickback Act’s 
civil liability provision can only be interpreted and applied in light of the Act’s 
stated purpose and goals.70 
A. Text and Structure 
When the plain language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts need 
not look further when interpreting statutory provisions.71 Although courts have 
been consistent in subjecting prime contractors to vicarious liability under the 
civil liability provision, a question remains as to whether there are instances 
when increased damages can be imposed in vicarious liability cases.72  
                                                                                                                           
 66 See KBR II, 727 F.3d at 354–55 (Jolly, J., concurring). Whether an employee’s knowledge is 
imputable requires a factual determination based on their authority, responsibility, or managerial role 
within the corporation. See, e.g., United States v. Josleyn, 206 F.3d 144, 159 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding 
that the individual’s express permission to act on behalf of the corporation rendered his knowledge of 
evidence should be imputed to the corporation); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 968 F.2d 
695, 701 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the officer’s responsibility of handling all of the insurance mat-
ters for the bank rendered her knowledge of fraudulent insurance activity imputable to the bank); 
Cont’l Oil, 706 F.2d at 1376 (holding that the individual’s responsibility of maintaining equipment, 
hiring employees, and chartering trips made his knowledge imputable to the corporation). 
 67 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES 
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 819 (3d. ed. 2001); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTER-
PRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 68 See infra notes 71–83 and accompanying text. 
 69 See infra notes 84–96 and accompanying text. 
 70 See infra notes 84–96 and accompanying text. 
 71 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 67, at 819 (explaining that it is generally understood that 
“plain language” does not mean the dictionary definition of each word but rather the meaning that an 
“ordinary” or “reasonable” person would ascertain); SCALIA, supra note 67, at 23 (instructing that 
textual interpretation should not be confused with strict-construction, and that although the text should 
not be construed leniently, it should also not be construed strictly). 
 72 See supra notes 48–66 and accompanying text (outlining the two conflicting interpretations). 
Recall that one interpretation suggests that increased damages are available only for direct liability, 
whereas the alternative interpretation allows for increased damages in vicarious liability cases. Com-
pare United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. (KBR II), 727 F.3d 343, 347–48 (5th 
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The most controversial word in the Anti-Kickback Act’s civil liability pro-
vision is the word “knowingly” in Section 8706(a)(1).73 The word, present in 
Section 8706(a)(1), is conspicuously absent from the provision’s express vicari-
ous liability subsection.74 The increased vicarious liability damages interpreta-
tion construes “knowingly” to mean that a prime contractor can be held vicari-
ously liable for knowingly engaging in kickback activity.75 This interpretation, it 
is argued, would not render Section 8706(a)(2) superfluous because Section 
8706(a)(2) would still apply to vicarious liability cases where there was no im-
putable knowledge of the kickback.76 
The limited vicarious liability interpretation construes the word “knowing-
ly” differently.77 This interpretation claims that the word “knowingly” should be 
                                                                                                                           
Cir. 2013) (serving as the first United States Court of Appeals to directly address the issue and decid-
ing, contrary to the common understanding of the provision, that a prime contractor may be held vi-
cariously liable for increased damages), with United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, 
Inc. (KBR I), 903 F. Supp. 2d 473, 490–91 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (limiting vicarious liability damages to 
Section 8706(a)(2) of the Anti-Kickback Act). Despite the conflict, both interpretations correctly note 
that because the statute defines the term “person” to include corporations, partnerships, and business 
associations of any kind, the word “person” alone does not restrict vicarious liability from being ap-
plied under Section 8706(a)(1). 41 U.S.C. §§ 8701(3), 8706(a)(1) (2012); see Vt. Agency of Natural 
Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 782 (2000) (explaining that corporations are pre-
sumptively covered by the term “person” in federal statutes).  
 73 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) (providing that the federal government may recover damages equal to 
double the amount of the kickback plus per-occurrence penalties from a person “that knowingly en-
gages in conduct prohibited by [the Act]”).  
 74 Compare id. (including the word “knowingly”), with id. § 8706(a)(2) (omitting a knowledge 
requirement). Because every word and clause in a statute must be given effect, the conflicting inter-
pretations of the provision each give different effect to the word “knowingly.” See infra notes 75–83 
and accompanying text (discussing the different interpretations’ views on the word “knowingly”); see 
also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 67, at 819 (explaining the importance of giving effect to every word 
in a statute); 3 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 65A:13 (7th ed., rev. vol. 2014) (emphasizing that in giving each word meaning, one should 
follow a plain-language interpretation unless otherwise specified by the text). 
 75 See KBR II, 727 F.3d at 348 (explaining that Congress’s decision to allow vicarious liability 
under both subsections indicates that increased damages are available for more culpable “knowing” 
violations of the Act). As discussed previously, a prime contractor corporation knowingly engages in 
kickback activity only when employees with imputable knowledge—those with requisite authority, 
responsibility, or managerial role—engage in kickback activity. See, e.g., United States v. Josleyn, 
206 F.3d 144, 159 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the individual’s express permission to act on behalf of 
the corporation rendered his knowledge of evidence should be imputed to the corporation); St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 968 F.2d 695, 701 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the officer’s re-
sponsibility of handling all of the insurance matters for the bank rendered her knowledge of fraudulent 
insurance activity imputable to the bank); Cont’l Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d 1365, 1376 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that the individual’s responsibility of maintaining equipment, hiring employees, 
and chartering trips made his knowledge imputable to the corporation); supra notes 63–65 and ac-
companying text. 
 76 KBR II, 727 F.3d at 348 (explaining that Congress decided to allow vicarious liability across 
the civil liability provision and maintained the effect of each subsection through a knowledge distinc-
tion). 
 77 See, e.g., United States v. Purdy, 144 F.3d 241, 243 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying vicarious liability 
under Section 8706(a)(2) without any reference to a knowledge requirement); Moore v. United States, 
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interpreted in light of the fact that Section 8706(a)(2) already expressly allows 
for vicarious liability.78 Accordingly, in light of the structure of the statute, the 
word “knowingly” is designed to address persons that engage in kickback activi-
ty in their individual capacity, not as a business entity.79 In the context of a prime 
contractor, this would apply either to an individual who functions as a prime 
contractor or to the representative of a prime contractor business that actually 
enters into the contract.80 Under this interpretation, Section 8706(a)(1) is specifi-
cally designed to punish intentional wrongdoers, not to hold prime contractors 
vicariously liable for kickbacks that were committed without their consent and 
outside their control.81 The conflicting interpretations of the civil liability provi-
sion reveal that the plain language of the provision is ambiguous and lacks inter-
pretive guidance.82 Therefore, the canons of statutory interpretation next require 
turning to the Anti-Kickback Act’s legislative history.83  
B. Legislative History 
When the plain language of a statute is ambiguous, legislative history can 
often provide useful guidance for determining the scope of the law.84 The House 
                                                                                                                           
347 F.2d 942, 943 (9th Cir. 1965) (limiting vicarious liability to Section 8706(a)(2) and the amount of 
the kickback); KBR I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 490–91 (finding that applying increased vicarious liability 
damages under Section 8706(a)(1) would render Section 8706(a)(2) superfluous). 
 78 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a) (2012). The canons of statutory interpretation require that each statutory 
provision be read in accordance with the whole act. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233–34 
(1993). The limited vicarious liability damages interpretation applies the whole act rule and posits that 
the express presence of vicarious liability in Section 8706(a)(2) highlights its absence in Section 
8706(a)(1). See KBR I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 490–91; see also Smith, 508 U.S. at 233. 
 79 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(2) (expressly imposing vicarious liability on prime contractors); KBR I, 
903 F. Supp. 2d at 490–91 (limiting increased damages to direct liability cases and restricting vicari-
ous liability to Section 8706(a)(2)).  
 80 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a); Purdy, 144 F.3d at 243. 
 81 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a); see KBR I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 490–91; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 655 n.134 (1990) (paraphrasing Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
pronouncement that the text of a statute should be interpreted to maintain consistency and coherency 
in the law). 
 82 Compare KBR II, 727 F.3d at 348 (interpreting the civil liability provision to allow for in-
creased damages in vicarious liability cases), with KBR I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 490–91 (limiting vicari-
ous liability damages to the amount of the kickback). 
 83 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1835–36 (2010) (explaining that a 
proper textualist approach considers legislative history surrounding enactment). 
 84 See Cheryl Boudreau et al., Statutory Interpretation and the Intentional(ist) Stance, 38 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 2131, 2133–36 (2005) (describing the intentionalist theory of statutory interpretation and 
explaining the value in discerning legislative intent when interpreting the text and structure of a stat-
ute); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 
GEO. L.J. 705, 714–15 (1992) (explaining that legislatures should be treated as rational actors, giving 
due weight to their motivations and intentions); Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpreta-
tion: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1651 (2014) (emphasizing the 
difference between legislative history and mere statutory history). 
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Report preceding the enactment of the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986 is the most 
salient indicator of legislative intent behind the civil liability provision.85 Unfor-
tunately, although Congress went to great lengths to discuss the purpose and 
goals of the Act, it offered little guidance into the appropriate interpretation of 
the civil liability provision’s language.86  
Just as the plain language of the statute left open strong arguments for mul-
tiple interpretations, Congress’s explanation of the amended provision’s mechan-
ics also invites conflicting understandings.87 On one hand, Congress’s discussion 
of the provision supports limiting vicarious liability damages because Congress 
explained that vicarious liability is fixed to the amount of the kickback.88 Fur-
thermore, Congress made no reference to vicarious liability in its explanation of 
increased damages.89 Since Congress specifically mentioned vicarious liability in 
one subsection and not the other, and subsequently limited that liability, one could 
argue that it is improper to read vicarious liability into Section 8706(a)(1).90 Ad-
ditionally, given that one of the express purposes of the amended Act was to ex-
pand its coverage to include vicarious liability, the lack of explicit vicarious lia-
bility language in Section 8706(a)(1) is strong evidence that Congress intended 
vicarious liability to be limited.91 
On the other hand, it can be argued that Congress’s specific emphasis on 
knowing violations supports the increased vicarious liability damages interpreta-
                                                                                                                           
 85 H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 11 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5968. (providing 
a section-by-section analysis of the 1986 amendments to the Anti-Kickback Act, specifically referenc-
ing pertinent language and its meaning within the context of kickback prosecution). 
 86 Id. at 10, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5967. The only notable mention of the actual text and structure 
of Section 8706(a) was as follows: “It raises the civil penalties, for knowing violations, to twice the 
amount of the kickback involved and up to $10,000 in fines. Further, it fixes vicarious liability, with-
out regard to fault, on the Federal prime contractor . . . . This vicarious no fault liability is limited to 
the amount of the kickback.” Id. 
 87 See id.; see also United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 
365, 371 (1988) (explaining that when statutory language is deemed “ambiguous,” conflicting argu-
ments arise as to which meaning of the statutory language is “compatible with the rest of the law”). 
 88 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 10, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5967; see also United States v. 
Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that Section 8706(a)(2) creates a distinct 
and exclusive cause of action in prime contractor vicarious liability cases). 
 89 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 10, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5967. 
 90 See Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991) (explaining that legislative silence should 
only be considered significant in statutory interpretation if the legislature was specifically vocal in a 
related portion of the statute), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005); see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 280–81 (2003) (holding that the statutory and legisla-
tive silence as to vicarious liability in tort actions under the Fair Housing Act was only significant 
because of the explicit departures from vicarious liability in other areas of the law). 
 91 See Gluck, supra note 83, at 1835–36 (explaining that legislative silence as to statutory inter-
pretation requires that the interpreter give the statute the meaning that is most consistent with the 
legislature’s express intentions and the legislature’s interpretive guidance in other provisions of the 
statute). 
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tion.92 Specifically, given that a “knowing[]” violation by a “person” already 
encompasses prime contractor corporations, explicitly including vicarious liabil-
ity language is redundant and unnecessary.93 This interpretation of the provision 
relies heavily on the lack of legislative guidance, emphasizing an ambiguous 
textual interpretation.94 
Despite the robust congressional history regarding the purpose and intent of 
the Anti-Kickback Act, it does not lead to a clear reading of the ambiguous civil 
liability provision.95 Because the text of the civil liability provision is ambiguous 
on its face, and the legislative history is inconclusive with respect to interpretive 
guidance, courts must instead interpret the provision in light of its stated purpose 
and goals.96 
III. LIMITING VICARIOUS LIABILITY: PROMOTING THE ANTI-KICKBACK 
ACT’S PURPOSE THROUGH STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
The lack of interpretive guidance provided by the Anti-Kickback Act of 
1986’s (“Anti-Kickback Act”) text and legislative history requires that courts 
interpret the Act’s civil liability provision in light of the Act’s stated purpose and 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 10 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5967; see also 
KBR II, 727 F.3d at 347–48 (finding vicarious liability available under both Section 8706(a)(1) and 
(2) and explaining that the knowledge distinction is what separates causes of action under each sub-
section). 
 93 H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 10, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5967. See generally Paul Brest, The Mis-
conceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980) (advocating a practical, 
dynamic approach to using legislative history in statutory interpretation, namely focusing on what was 
said and not reading into what was omitted). 
 94 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 10, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5967. 
 95 Id. (offering a brief introduction to the structure of the statute but giving no further guidance as 
to the preferred interpretation of the Anti-Kickback Act’s civil liability provision); see also Timbers of 
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd, 484 U.S. at 371 (explaining that ambiguous statutes should be interpreted 
to be compatible with the accompanying law); Cheryl Boudreau et al., supra note 84, at 2133–36 
(explaining the value in discerning legislative intent when interpreting statutes). 
96 See Brest, supra note 93, at 209–11 (advocating using legislative history in statutory interpreta-
tion); Gluck, supra note 83, at 1835–36 (explaining the importance of interpretation aligning with 
Congress’s express intentions). It is necessary for courts to adopt and endorse an interpretation of the 
civil liability provisions that not only complies with the purpose and intent of the statute, but that 
promotes and furthers that purpose. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 
OF STATUTES 285 (1975) (describing that the intent of the legislature is “immediate” and purpose of 
the legislature is “ulterior”); Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory 
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 92 (explaining the importance of interpreting a statute in 
light of its purpose because purposivism is grounded in legislative preference and is a “form of faith-
ful agency”); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Pro-
cess: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 815 (1994) 
(stating that “purposivism calls on judges to identify the statute’s broader purposes and to resolve the 
interpretive question in light of those purposes”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regu-
latory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 429 (1989) (describing the goal of purposivist interpretation as 
seeking to decipher how the enacting legislature would have resolved the question of interpretation 
had it been presented to them).  
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goals.97 This Part analyzes the Act’s three main goals and argues that courts 
should interpret the civil liability provision to limit vicarious liability to the 
amount of the kickback involved.98 First, Section A argues that the Act’s deter-
rence and compensation goals are best achieved by limiting prime contractor 
vicarious liability damages.99 Second, Section B posits that the Act’s goal of 
maintaining market efficiency through efficient subcontractor selection is best 
accomplished by limiting vicarious liability damages.100 Finally, Section C con-
tends that limiting vicarious liability damages imposes appropriate levels of risk 
on prime contractors while simultaneously protecting their role in government 
defense contracting.101  
A. Deterrence and Compensation 
The Anti-Kickback Act’s primary goal is to deter prime contractors from 
overcharging on government defense contracts and to compensate the govern-
ment in the event kickbacks occur.102 The civil liability provision’s allowance for 
increased damages103 is pivotal to the Act’s deterrence and compensation 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See supra notes 67–96 and accompanying text (explaining the lack of interpretive guidance for 
the Act). The Anti-Kickback Act functions to accomplish three main goals. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, 
at 4–5, 10–11, 19, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960–62, 5967–68, 5976. First, the Act aims to deter prime 
contractors from overcharging the government as a result of kickbacks and to compensate the gov-
ernment in the event of a kickback. See id. Second, the Act seeks to maintain market efficiency by 
ensuring that prime contractors enter into subcontracts on the basis of expertise and cost-efficiency, 
not kickbacks. See id. Finally, the Act creates a regulatory structure that will impose appropriate levels 
of risk on prime contractors. See id.; supra notes 71–96 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 102–165 and accompanying text. 
 99 See infra notes 102–127 and accompanying text. 
 100 See infra notes 128–140 and accompanying text. 
 101 See infra notes 141–165 and accompanying text. 
 102 H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5962. The House 
Report explains that regardless of the form of the bribe, all kickbacks undermine federal procurement. 
Id. In 1985 alone, the United States spent approximately $147 billion on defense procurements, $46 
billion of which was paid to subcontractors. Id. With the stated value of kickbacks ranging from two 
to fifteen percent of contract prices, the magnitude of the loss to the government is extreme. Id. As 
such, one of the stated goals of the 1986 amendments is to deter kickback activity to the greatest ex-
tent possible and to recover adequate compensation in the event of a kickback. Id. The purpose of 
reducing overcharging on government defense contracts is further evidenced by the established con-
clusive presumption that the amount of the kickback is always included in the price of a subcontract 
and is ultimately borne by the government. See Travers v. United States, 361 F.2d 753, 755 (1st Cir. 
1966) (explaining that the conclusive presumption that any payment is included in the price of a sub-
contract and borne by the government is the “keystone of the civil liability created by the statute”); 
Jensen v. United States, 326 F.2d 891, 895 (9th Cir. 1964) (explaining that there is a conclusive pre-
sumption that the cost of a kickback is borne by the government, and that such a conclusive presump-
tion is not offensive to due process because “it is based on a logical and probable connection with the 
antecedent facts”). 
 103 Recall that Section 8706(a)(1) allows for increased damages equal to double the amount of the 
kickback, plus an additional $11,000 penalty for each violation of the Act. 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) 
(2012); 28 C.F.R § 85.3(a)(13) (2014) (adjusting the penalty from its original value of $10,000). 
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goals.104 Despite the importance of increased damages in direct liability cases, 
this Section argues that allowing increased damages in vicarious liability cases 
has no impact on deterrence and creates a substantial risk of government over-
compensation.105 Subsection 1 first establishes that increased vicarious liability 
damages have no impact on deterrence.106 Subsection 2 then determines that in-
creased vicarious liability damages are unnecessary to properly compensate the 
government.107  
1. Increased Vicarious Liability Damages Have No Impact on Deterrence  
Increasing direct liability damages substantially deters misconduct by im-
posing liability costs that outweigh the potential benefits of misconduct.108 The 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (outlining the Act’s purpose and 
goals). In order to consider the deterrence and compensation effects of increased damages, it is im-
portant to understand the procedure and contractual obligations of the government, prime contractors, 
and subcontractors in defense contracting. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 1. In the majority of 
defense contracts, once the government has selected a prime contractor, the prime contractor is enti-
tled to select its own subcontractors. See, e.g., See United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & 
Root, Inc. (KBR II), 727 F.3d 343, 344–46 (5th Cir. 2013) (allowing the prime contractor to select 
subcontractors to fulfill the government defense contract); United States v. Purdy, 144 F.3d 241, 243 
(2d Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Perry, 431 F.2d 1020, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 1970) (same); How-
ard v. United States, 345 F.2d 126, 128 (1st Cir. 1965) (same). From there, prime contractors will 
charge the government for both its services and the subcontractor’s services. See, e.g., United States v. 
Grossman, 400 F.2d 951, 953–54 (4th Cir. 1968); Travers, 361 F.2d at 755; Moore v. United States, 
347 F.2d 942, 943–44 (9th Cir. 1965). The contract between the government and the prime contractor 
can take many forms, but ultimately the prime contractor will charge the government in one of two 
ways. See DEF. CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY, DCAAM 7641.90, INFORMATION FOR CONTRACTORS 
68–70 (2012), available at http://www.dcaa.mil/dcaap_7641.90.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
PWP5-LKZD. Defense contracts are regularly performed over a long period of time. See U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF., supra note 1 (providing examples of fixed-price with economic-price-adjustment contracts, 
firm-fixed-price and indefinite-delivery contracts, and maximum modification contracts); supra note 
42 and accompanying text. The prime contractor can either pay subcontractors directly and include 
those costs in its prime contract with the government, or it can periodically bill the government for the 
subcontracts it incurs, charging a small additional fee each time. See DEF. CONTRACT AUDIT AGEN-
CY, supra at 68–70 (providing detailed procedures by which prime contractors can select subcontrac-
tors and recover subcontractor costs from the federal government). Regardless of the method selected, 
the inclusion of kickbacks will increase the cost of subcontracts, resulting in the prime contractor 
overcharging the government. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 5, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5962. In re-
sponse to this increased subcontract price, the prime contractor will either bill the government for the 
inflated subcontract price or include the inflated price in its own prime contract. See id. The Act’s 
civil liability provision is specifically aimed at reducing this overcharging of the government. See id. 
 105 See infra notes 108–127 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 108–115 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 116–127 and accompanying text. 
 108 See Anthony A. Braga & David L. Weisburd, The Effects of Focused Deterrence Strategies on 
Crime: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence, 49 J. RES. CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 323, 324 (2012) (arguing that where the costs of liability directly relate to the misconduct com-
mitted, actors will refrain from the misconduct when the liability costs exceed the expected benefit); 
see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 
626–27 (1997) (explaining that punitive damages are most appropriate where they are focused on 
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imposition of increased vicarious liability damages under the civil liability pro-
vision, however, would not have the same deterrence effect.109 Increased vicari-
ous liability damages would not deter kickbacks because the increased liability 
costs are misdirected and prime contractor cost-benefit analysis is limited under 
defense contracts.110  
Increasing vicarious liability damages will not deter kickbacks because 
such an approach falsely presumes that prime contractors have actual knowledge 
of kickbacks.111 Kickbacks on defense contracts are primarily given and re-
ceived at the individual level, resulting in prime contractors unknowingly billing 
the government for kickbacks.112 Subjecting prime contractors to increased dam-
                                                                                                                           
wrongdoers and designed to correlate with the level of compensation); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness 
and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1982) (discussing the im-
portance of balanced deterrence regimes). Increasing the liability costs increases the likelihood that 
those costs will outweigh the potential benefits, thus increasing deterrence. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping 
Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 472–74 (2008) (explaining that punitive damages in criminal law advance 
the interests of deterrence); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 252–53 (1981) (im-
posing punitive damages against municipalities that violated the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as a means 
of deterring future violations); see also Braga & Weisburd, supra at 324. This deterrence factor is 
even more prominent given the extensive liability burden already imposed under defense contracts. 
See DEF. CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY, supra note 104, at 68–70 (illuminating the extreme burden of 
increased damages by providing examples of the substantial monetary value of both prime contracts 
and subcontracts).  
 109 See Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1093, 
1094 (1993) (explaining that efficient deterrence must include targeted risk and impose appropriate 
levels of compensation). Although deterrence is strong in direct liability cases, in vicarious liability 
cases the party being prosecuted usually has not played any role in the giving or receiving of the kick-
back. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 4–5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960–62 (ex-
plaining that the purpose of the Anti-Kickback Act is to deter the giving and receiving of kickbacks). 
Deterrence is therefore less targeted, or negligible, where the prime contractor lacks actual knowledge 
of the misconduct. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Secu-
rities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695 (explaining that in the majority of 
corporate vicarious liability cases, the corporation has satisfied good faith standards and is only liable 
as a result of the actions of its agent). 
 110 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 4–5, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960–62 (describing the structure of 
defense contracts and stating the purpose of the statute as deterring the kickbacks themselves). 
 111 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) (2012) (applying increased damages for “knowing” violations). There-
fore, if Section 8706(a)(1) were interpreted to include vicarious liability, prime contractors would be 
subject to increased damages when knowledge of a kickback was imputed. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Ernst 
& Young, 967 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that whether knowledge is imputed to the 
corporation depends on the knowing individual’s level of responsibility); Cont’l Oil Co. v. Bonanza 
Corp., 706 F.2d 1365, 1376 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the question of whether knowledge can be 
imputed depends on an individual’s level of responsibility within a corporation); see supra notes 63–
65 and accompanying text (discussing how employee knowledge can be imputed to a prime contractor 
corporation). 
 112 See, e.g., Purdy, 144 F.3d at 243 (discussing kickbacks given and received by individuals that 
had not even contemplated the relationship with the government); United States v. Gemmell, 160 F. 
Supp. 792, 794 (E.D. Penn. 1958) (providing kickbacks to the prime contractor’s agent without the 
actual knowledge of the prime contractor); United States v. Davio, 136 F. Supp. 423, 426–27 (E.D. 
Mich. 1955) (showing how sharing profits with prime contractor’s agent could take place without a 
prime contractor’s actual knowledge); cf. Deanna N. Conn, When Contract Should Preempt Tort 
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ages when they only have imputed knowledge of kickbacks fails to deter the par-
ties actually giving or receiving the kickbacks.113 Furthermore, because imputed 
knowledge is determined on a case-by-case basis, prime contractors are unable 
to engage in the meaningful cost-benefit analysis necessary to avoid future kick-
backs.114 Prime contractors are unable to accurately predict their future costs of 
liability or quantify the benefits of the kickbacks, rendering the oversight deci-
sions necessary for deterrence impossible.115 
                                                                                                                           
Remedies: Limits on Vicarious Liability for Acts of Independent Contractors, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 179, 186–187 (2009) (explaining that vicarious liability is unpredictable because a threshold 
determination of employees’ status is difficult). For example, imagine that a prime contractor instructs 
its employee to hire foreign subcontractors to aid in completing a prime contract to deliver supplies to 
troops overseas. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. If the employee picks a subcontractor 
based on a kickback, the prime contract price will become inflated and the prime contractor would 
likely submit the contract price to the government without ever knowing the price included the value 
of a kickback. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. Notice that if increased vicarious liabil-
ity damages were available, the prime contractor would have just subjected itself to these increased 
damages. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. The likelihood that the prime contractor did 
not know about a kickback is even further amplified by the fact that the Anti-Kickback Act now includes 
reporting requirements when a prime contractor has reasonable grounds to believe a kickback has oc-
curred. See 41 U.S.C. § 8703(c). 
 113 See 1 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 4:12 (2d ed. 2014) (explaining that in many jurisdictions that impose damages aimed at deter-
rence, the hope for deterrence can never be satisfied because the statutes in question only have the 
practical effect of deterring someone other than the actual defendant); see also Lawrence v. Va. Ins. 
Reciprocal, 979 F.2d 1053, 1056–57 (5th Cir. 1992) (attempting to promote deterrence through puni-
tive damages in tort cases but failing to meet that goal because the party being prosecuted lacks 
knowledge). 
 114 See Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 171; Cont’l Oil, 706 F.2d at 1376; supra notes 63–65 and 
accompanying text (describing imputation of employee knowledge to a prime contractor corporation). 
For deterrence to work, the increased costs imposed must force actors to engage in a cost-benefit 
analysis between the potential liability costs and the benefits received from engaging in the miscon-
duct. See E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 87–90, 99–103 (Routledge 5th 
ed., 2007) (1976) (providing an introduction to the cost-benefit analysis forced upon parties that be-
come subject to increased risks of liability); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in 
Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335, 338–40 (2011) (suggesting the 
concept of net-benefit maximization as a plausible public goal of cost-benefit analysis). 
 115 See H. David Robison & Rudy Santore, Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring, 46 
FIN. REV. 281, 282 (2011) (arguing that, for increased liability to deter activity, the actor needs to be 
able to quantify the costs of that liability and the benefits of the misconduct, and ultimately determine 
that the costs outweigh the benefits). Calculating the potential costs of the liability involves determin-
ing the amount of potential liability and the likelihood of liability. See MISHAN & QUAH, supra note 
114, at 87–90, 99–103 (providing an introduction to the cost-benefit analysis forced upon parties that 
become subject to increased risks of liability). If increased vicarious liability damages are imposed 
here, prime contractors will have difficulty measuring these factors. See id. Since prime contractors 
may not know which employees have imputable knowledge until after the fact, prime contractors will 
have a difficult time determining their overall exposure to liability and measuring the amount of that 
liability. See Robison & Santore, supra at 302 (discussing liability exposure risks). Prime contractors 
will also have difficulty measuring the expected benefits of kickbacks because most kickbacks occur 
without the prime contractor’s knowledge. See id. If prime contractors cannot accurately engage in 
cost-benefit analysis, they cannot seek to minimize their exposure to extensive liability. See id. There-
fore, there will be no deterrence as a result of increased damages. See Arlen, supra note 109, at 1094. 
1750 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1731 
2. Increased Vicarious Liability Damages Are Unnecessary to Adequately 
Compensate the Government  
 Another goal of the amended Anti-Kickback Act is to adequately compen-
sate the government in the event kickbacks occur.116 Due to the concern of inad-
equate recoveries under the original Act, the current civil liability provision al-
lows for increased damages for knowing violations of the Act.117 This inclusion 
of increased damages, however, should be appropriately limited to direct liability 
cases.118 A more expansive interpretation allowing increased damages for vicari-
ous liability is unnecessary to adequately compensate the government and cre-
ates a substantial risk of overcompensation.119 
Indeed, the goal of the Anti-Kickback Act is to “adequately” compensate 
the government, not to compensate the government to the greatest extent possi-
ble.120 Allowing increased damages for vicarious liability is likely to overcom-
                                                                                                                           
Indeed, there is a great deal of scholarship suggesting that increasing liability has no deterrence effect 
on business entities, even when they are aware of their own wrongdoing. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., 
“No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Pun-
ishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 401–02 (1981) (arguing that if the increased penalties are not severe 
enough to actually threaten the solvency of the corporation, then a typical response is not to decrease 
the likelihood of misconduct, but rather to reduce costs elsewhere to account for the potential in-
creased costs of liability); E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don’t Deter Corporate Miscon-
duct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053, 1056–57 (1989) (explaining that increasing liability and im-
posing punitive damages on corporations may inadvertently decrease economic incentives for compli-
ance, undermine individual responsibility, and encourage “business-as-usual” activity by corporation).  
 116 H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 7 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5964. The House 
Report accompanying the amended Act explains that limiting civil penalties to the amount of the 
kickback is an inadequate recovery. See id. (explaining that the original version of the Anti-Kickback 
Act was outdated and antiquated because it only recognized the harm of the value of the kickback, 
which the House Report calls “the tip of the iceberg” in the realities of the extreme costs incurred by 
the government when kickbacks occur). Further, damages in the amount of the kickback do not reflect 
the true costs and harms that the government may have suffered as a result of the kickback. Id. The 
House Report reasons that the cost of a kickback may exceed the actual amount of the kickback be-
cause the government also faces the risks of entering into non-competitive contracts as a result of 
kickbacks, receiving substandard equipment because of contract modification, and incurring substan-
tial costs investigating and prosecuting the misconduct. Id.  
 117 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) (2012); see H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 7, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5964. 
 118 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 7, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5964. Although an empirical study 
measuring the government’s direct and indirect costs in all kickback related investigation would prove 
useful in determining adequate government compensation, a theoretical and policy driven analysis can 
also shed light on the subject. See id. Furthermore, given the extensive nature and costs associated 
with defense contracts, it is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to calculate the government’s 
direct and indirect costs associated with kickbacks. See Auditor Fraud Resources, OFFICE OF INSPEC-
TOR GEN.: U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.dodig.mil/resources/Fraud/index.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/25DH-CX6Q (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (providing a database of fraud resources utilized to 
calculate and recover the extensive costs to the government of kickbacks and inflated subcontract 
costs). 
 119 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 7, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5964. 
 120 See Id.; see also Valerie P. Hans & Valeria F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to 
Quantitative Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 121 (2011) 
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pensate the government because the civil liability provision already allows for an 
extensive recovery.121 Namely, the government can already receive damages 
from any party involved in the kickback, many of whom are undeniably subject 
to increased direct liability damages.122 Additionally, the government’s recovery 
is not limited to the civil liability provision or the Anti-Kickback Act general-
ly.123 The government can seek damages for kickbacks under both the civil and 
criminal provisions of the Anti-Kickback Act, and can also seek damages under 
other statutes.124 For example, seeking damages under the Anti-Kickback Act 
does not inhibit the government from also seeking damages under the False 
Claims Act.125 In such circumstances where the government prosecutes multiple 
parties and utilizes multiple statutes, the addition of increased vicarious liability 
damages is likely to drastically overcompensate the government.126 Accordingly, 
courts should interpret the Act’s civil liability provision to limit vicarious liabil-
ity to the amount of the kickback involved.127 
B. Maintaining Defense Contract Market Efficiency 
The Anti-Kickback Act’s second goal is to maintain market efficiency by 
ensuring that prime contractors enter into subcontracts on the basis of expertise 
and cost-efficiency, not based on kickbacks.128 Although the government’s selec-
                                                                                                                           
(explaining that damage awards often overcompensate plaintiffs and are hostile to large businesses 
and corporations).  
 121 See 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1)–(2); see also Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep 
Your Promises: A Disgorgement Theory of Contract Remedies, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV 1181, 1197–
98 (2011) (evaluating the risks of overcompensation in contract fraud by awarding one party more 
than the benefits of its bargain). 
 122 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) (imposing civil damages equal to double the amount of the kickback 
plus additional penalties for multiple violations against any person that knowingly violates Act); id. 
§ 8706(a)(2) (imposing civil damages equal to the amount of the kickback against an person whose 
employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee violates the Act); see United States v. Kruse, 101 
F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (E.D. Va. 2000) (recovering damages from both the prime contractor and an 
officer of the prime contractor); Jensen, 326 F.2d at 892 (awarding damages against both the individ-
ual that accepted the kickback and the corporation). 
 123 See Morse Diesel Int’l, Inc., v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 116, 128–29 (2007) (holding that a 
contractor may be liable under both the Anti-Kickback Act and the False Claims Act for the same acts 
without being duplicative).  
 124 See 41 U.S.C. § 8706 (2012) (allowing civil remedies for violations of the Anti-Kickback 
Act): id. § 8707 (allowing fines for criminal violations of the Anti-Kickback Act); False Claims Act, 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012) (providing damages under the False Claims Act).  
 125 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The False Claims Act prohibits knowingly presenting a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval to the United States government. See id. §§ 3729(a), 
3729(a)(1). In addition, the False Claims Act prohibits knowingly making, using, or causing to be 
made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim. Id. § 3729(a)(2). 
 126 See id. § 3729(a); 41 U.S.C. §§ 8706–8707; see also Thel & Siegelman, supra note 121, at 
1197–98 (2011) (discussing risks of overcompensation in contract fraud). 
 127 But see KBR II, 727 F.3d at 348 (expanding vicarious liability under the Act’s civil liability 
provision). 
 128 H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 6–7 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5963–64. 
1752 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1731 
tion of prime contractors impacts defense contract market efficiency, the selec-
tion of subcontractors is arguably even more influential in dictating the level of 
market efficiency.129 This Section posits that the Act’s goal of maintaining mar-
ket efficiency through efficient subcontractor selection is best accomplished by 
limiting vicarious liability damages.130 
The market for government defense contracts involves operations on a 
global scale with billions of dollars in government expenses.131 This market be-
comes inefficient when prime contractors select subcontractors on the basis of 
kickbacks rather than cost-efficiency and expertise.132 In practice, subcontractors 
provide kickbacks to prime contractors to either win the bid for a subcontract or 
to induce the prime contractor to transmit an otherwise inflated subcontract price 
to the government.133 In either form, kickbacks distort market efficiency because 
they create a substantial risk of defense contracts being fulfilled at inflated prices 
and by inefficient, non-expert subcontractors.134 Interpreting the Act’s civil lia-
bility provision questions whether subjecting prime contractors to the risk of 
increased vicarious liability damages will encourage them to make more effi-
cient subcontractor decisions.135  
                                                                                                                           
 129 See DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF SMALL BUS. PROGRAMS, TIPS FOR DOD CONTRACTORS SUB-
MITTING SUBCONTRACTING REPORTS 1, http://www.acq.osd.mil/osbp/docs/tips_for_contractors_
subcontracting.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AG45-BAQ7 (last revised Mar. 2012) (explaining the 
process and criteria by which prime contractors select subcontractors and the method through which 
subcontract reports are submitted to the federal government). Furthermore, after the prime contractor 
selects a subcontractor, the prime contractor is responsible for transmitting the subcontractor costs to 
the government. See id. Subcontractor selection is important for efficiency, quality, and accountability 
of defense contracts. See Chong Wang & Joseph G. San Miguel, Are Cost-Plus Defense Contracts 
(Justifiably) out of Favor?, 2 J. GOVERNMENTAL & NONPROFIT ACCT. 1, 6–7 (2013) (describing the 
role of subcontractors in the completion of prime contracts).  
 130 But see KBR II, 727 F.3d at 348 (expanding vicarious liability under the Act’s civil liability 
provision). 
 131 MOSHE SCHWARTZ & WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41820, DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE TRENDS IN OVERSEAS CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS 5 (2013) (calculating that in fiscal year 
2012, $44 billion of the Department of Defense’s total contract obligations were performed outside of 
the United States).  
 132 See Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and 
Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 87 (1999) (describing the contract inefficiencies that arise in the 
event of fraud); cf. Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A 
Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2178–81 (2010) (explaining that in securities fraud liabil-
ity, the social costs and inefficiencies created by fraud must outweigh the enforcement costs).  
 133 See DEF. CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY, supra note 104, at 68–70 (providing detailed procedures 
by which prime contractors can select subcontractors and recover subcontractor costs from the federal 
government). Regardless of the method selected, the inclusion of kickbacks will increase the cost of 
subcontracts, resulting in the prime contractor overcharging the government. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-
964, at 5, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5962. 
 134 See Ayres & Madison, supra note 132, at 87–88; cf. Rose, supra note 132, at 2178–81 (de-
scribing similar inefficiencies in securities fraud).  
 135 See 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a) (2012); KBR II, 727 F.3d at 348–49 (expanding the application of the 
Act’s civil liability provision to include increased damages in vicarious liability cases); H.R. REP. NO. 
99-964, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5962.  
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The analysis of this question mirrors that of deterrence, and courts should 
similarly conclude that the goals of the Act are best satisfied by limiting vicarious 
liability damages.136 Namely, if the Act’s purpose is to avoid prime contractors 
making inefficient subcontractor decisions, then allowing increased vicarious lia-
bility damages does nothing to further that goal.137 Where prime contractors have 
no actual knowledge of kickbacks, their selection of subcontractors will not be 
influenced by kickbacks.138 Furthermore, direct liability and increased damages 
are already imposed on the individuals that actually select subcontractors, thus 
promoting efficient subcontractor selection.139 Because applying increased vicar-
ious liability damages on prime contractors is misguided and does not impact 
subcontractor selection, the Act’s civil liability provision should be interpreted to 
limit vicarious liability damages to the amount of the kickback involved.140  
C. Imposition of Risk in Continued Defense Contracting 
The Anti-Kickback Act’s third goal is to create a regulatory structure that 
imposes appropriate levels of risk on prime contractors, while simultaneously 
protecting their role in government defense contracting.141 The amended Act 
increases prime contractor self-regulation by requiring that they adhere to con-
                                                                                                                           
 136 See Arlen, supra note 109, at 1094 (explaining the importance of targeted risk and compensa-
tion levels in efficient deterrence); supra notes 108–115 and accompanying text (arguing that increas-
ing vicarious liability damages would not deter kickbacks because the increased liability costs are 
misdirected and prime contractor cost-benefit analysis is limited under defense contracts).  
 137 See 41 U.S.C. § 8706; H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 5, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5962. 
 138 See Cont’l Oil, 706 F.2d at 1376 (discussing imputed knowledge). Prime contractors will have 
no direct knowledge of kickbacks if vicarious liability is applied to Section 8706(a)(1) because the 
knowledge requirement will only be satisfied through imputed knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. 
Josleyn, 206 F.3d 144, 159 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the individual’s express permission to act on 
behalf of the corporation rendered his knowledge of evidence should be imputed to the corporation); 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 968 F.2d 695, 701 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the of-
ficer’s responsibility of handling all of the insurance matters for the bank rendered her knowledge of 
fraudulent insurance activity imputable to the bank); Cont’l Oil, 706 F.2d at 1376 (holding that the 
individual’s responsibility of maintaining equipment, hiring employees, and chartering trips made his 
knowledge imputable to the corporation). 
 139 See 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) (imposing increased damages on any person that knowingly vio-
lates the Act); H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 6, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5963 (explaining that the 
amended Act is designed to discourage the selection of subcontractors on the basis of kickbacks).  
 140 See 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1); H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 6, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5963. 
 141 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 6 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5963. This 
goal is often overlooked or minimized in light of the focus on deterrence and compensation. See KBR 
II, 727 F.3d at 348–49 (expressing the importance of deterrence in light of the risk that the govern-
ment could respond to increased costs by raising taxes, ultimately extending the harm of kickbacks to 
taxpayers); Purdy, 144 F.3d at 244 (explaining the most important goal of the amended Anti-
Kickback Act as the assurance of compensation and the extension of deterrence). The successful func-
tion of the government defense contracting system, however, depends as much on this goal as any 
other. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 6, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5963. 
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tractual and reporting requirements.142 Given these enhanced self-regulatory 
measures, courts should interpret the Act’s civil liability provision to limit vicar-
ious liability damages.143 
The Act’s civil liability provision should be interpreted to limit vicarious li-
ability damages because prime contractors may be unable to bear the risk of 
more extensive liability.144 Large government defense contracts impose signifi-
cant variable and unpredictable costs on prime contractors, and those costs al-
ready make it difficult for prime contractors to bear the risk of liability.145 The 
imposition of increased vicarious liability damages could very likely exacerbate 
prime contractors’ risk of liability to an unmanageable level.146 When prime con-
                                                                                                                           
 142 41 U.S.C. § 8703(a) (2012) (requiring that defense contracts between a contractor and the 
government specify that the prime contractor will “have in place and follow reasonable procedures 
designed to prevent and detect violations of [the Act] in its own operations and direct business rela-
tionships”); id. § 8703(c) (requiring that a prime contractor “that has reasonable grounds to believe 
that a violation of [the Act] may have occurred shall promptly report the possible violation” to the 
government). 
 143 See id. § 8706; H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 6, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5963; see also Assaf 
Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REV. 271, 277–78 (2008) 
(explaining that corporate liability, when expanded too greatly, can serve as a “corporate death penal-
ty”). Vicarious liability should be carefully tailored to impose appropriate levels of risk without in-
flicting the “corporate death penalty.” See Hamdani & Klement, supra at 277–78. 
144 41 U.S.C. § 8706; see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 69 (5th ed. 1984) (describing vicarious liability as adhering to a policy of deliberately allo-
cating risk of losses to the party most capable of bearing those risks); Hamdani & Klement, supra note 
143, at 290–91 (providing that firms must determine how much capital to invest in compliance with 
regulations based on their expected ability to bear liability costs); William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, 
Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285, 
1296 (2000) (explaining that corporations by their nature accept some risk of vicarious liability).  
 145 See Bruce D. Page, Jr., When Reliance is Detrimental: Economic, Moral, and Policy Argu-
ments for Expectation Damages in Contracts Terminated for the Convenience of the Government, 61 
A.F. L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2008) (describing that costs of government contracts exceed that of similar 
private contracts based on uncertainty in performance and efficiency). Corporate costs include the 
costs of uncertain business cycles, the fluctuating costs of raw materials and investment capital, and 
the risk that contractors will not fulfill their contracts in a productive, cost efficient manner. See Lau-
fer & Strudler, supra note 144, at 1298–1301. 
 146 See Press Release, U.S Attorney’s Office: D.C., Former Business Executive Please Guilty to 
Federal Charges in Alleged $28 Million Bribery and Kickback Scheme (Mar. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/news/2012/mar/12-095.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4PT3-4WSG 
(recounting the conviction for a $28 million kickback scheme). Aside from the shear magnitude of 
increased damages, such damages also include an element of unpredictability stemming from the fact 
that prime contractors will not definitively know which employees have knowledge that can be imput-
ed to the prime contractor and trigger increased damages until after the fact. See Cont’l Oil, 706 F.2d 
at 1376 (explaining that imputable knowledge is based on the responsibility and authority of the em-
ployee); 3 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 63, § 807 (discussing the ability of employee knowledge to 
be imputed to the corporation). 
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tractors are unable to bear the risk of liability, they will stop seeking government 
contracts to the detriment of government defense contracting generally.147 
Furthermore, even if prime contractors could financially bear the risk of in-
creased liability, vicarious liability should be limited because more extensive 
liability will substantially hinder the role of prime contractors in defense con-
tracting.148 Specifically, faced with the risk of increased liability, prime contrac-
tors will make corresponding business decisions that could disrupt the dynamics 
of defense contracting or even challenge the stability of defense contracting as a 
whole.149 Vicarious liability under the Act’s civil liability provision should be 
limited to avoid these instability risks in a defense contract system that exceeds 
$600 billion annually.150  
First, in response to the risk of increased liability, prime contractors could 
allocate more resources towards oversight in an effort to reduce the probability 
of liability.151 Given that defense contracts are already extremely expensive to 
perform, the cost of additional oversight will likely have to be externalized.152 
                                                                                                                           
 147 See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 143, at 291 (explaining that one of the biggest drawbacks 
to corporate vicarious liability is that it imposes the harshest sanctions even against corporations that 
make an adequate effort to police the conduct of their employees). 
 148 See Conn, supra note 112, at 207–10 (explaining the interplay of contract law and vicarious 
liability). Parties contract based on their expected liability and the amount of liability they can finan-
cially bear. See id. Therefore, imposing greater liability than the parties accounted for in contracting 
can hinder their ability to perform the contract and pursue future contracts. See id; Assaf Hamdani, 
Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 102–05 (2003) (discussing the appropriate levels of lia-
bility in vicarious liability). 
 149 See, e.g., Press Release, Raytheon Company, Raytheon Consolidates Businesses and An-
nounces Key Executive Roles (Mar. 25, 2013), available at http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.
php?s=43&item=2300, archived at http://perma.cc/VP8U-EDSX (announcing the consolidation of the 
business operations of one of the largest domestic government contractors); Consolidated Afloat Net-
works and Enterprise Services (CANES), NORTHROP GRUMMAN, http://www.northropgrumman.com/
capabilities/canes/Pages/default.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/QG35-2DHP (last visited Nov. 16, 
2014) (describing the consolidation of a contractor’s business to “increase capability and affordabil-
ity”); cf. Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 31–33 (2008) (discussing that in the face of increased securities liability and regu-
lation, each corporation has to determine how it will respond). Prime contractors could essentially 
decide between three courses of action when faced with increased vicarious liability. See Conn, supra 
note 112, at 207–10 (investigating corporate decision making in the face of corporate liability). They 
could allocate more resources towards oversight of their employees and subcontractors, continue to 
operate as they did without the risk of increased liability, or determine that the increased liability risk 
is too great and refrain from seeking future defense contracts. See id.  
 150 41 U.S.C. § 8706 (2012); see WALKER, supra note 10, at 1 (providing that U.S. defense spend-
ing totaled $619 billion in 2013); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 1 (showing the magnitude of daily 
defense contracts);  
 151 See Conn, supra note 112, at 207–10; Hamdani, supra note 148, at 17.  
 152 See Shawn J. Bayern, False Efficiency and Missed Opportunities in Law and Economics, 86 
TUL. L. REV. 135, 174–76 (2011) (discussing the externalization of corporate costs). The global scale 
and continuous nature of defense contracts already makes the cost of performing those contracts sub-
stantial. See, e.g., KBR II, 727 F.3d at 344–45 (characterizing a government defense contract struc-
tured as an “indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract,” meaning that the Army would periodical-
1756 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1731 
The most plausible way for prime contractors to externalize that cost will be to 
incorporate the oversight costs into their government contracts.153 Additionally, 
where a prime contractor can externalize the costs of increased oversight, that 
oversight is likely to be performed more inefficiently than if the prime contractor 
had internalized the cost.154 As a result, in its efforts to avoid being overcharged 
on defense contracts, the government will have created a regime where it is now 
paying higher contract prices for inefficient prime contractor oversight.155  
Second, in response to the risk of increased liability, prime contractors 
could elect not to account for the risk and continue to operate in the same man-
ner.156 Indeed, this renders the government no more protected from kickback 
activity than it is without increased vicarious liability damages.157 Therefore, 
forcing prime contractors into insolvency as a result of excessive vicarious liabil-
ity would be the only result of increasing damages.158 This leaves all parties in a 
vulnerable position and makes the market for government defense contracting 
unworkable.159 
Finally, in response to the risk of increased liability, prime contractors 
could determine that the liability risk and oversight costs necessary to compen-
sate for that risk are too great.160 As discussed previously, if prime contractor risk 
is unbearable, prime contractors will stop seeking government contracts.161 The 
likelihood of this prime contractor response is amplified by the expansive nature 
of government defense contracts and the shear impracticality of overseeing such 
                                                                                                                           
ly issue discrete task orders that the prime contractor could either complete directly or through sub-
contractors); SCHWARTZ & GINSBERG, supra note 131, at 5 (reporting $44 billion in defense contract 
obligations being performed overseas). 
 153 See Laufer & Strudler, supra note 144, at 1296 (discussing risk shifting in corporate vicarious 
liability).  
 154 See Barak Atiram, Market Dynamics in Corporate Tort Externalization: The Hidden Assump-
tion of Corporate Social Efficiency, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 347, 359–60 (2009) (discussing cor-
porate liability and cost externalization). 
 155 See Laufer & Strudler, supra note 144, at 1296; Atiram, supra note 154, at 359–60. 
 156 See Conn, supra note 112, at 207–10; Hamdani, supra note 148, at 17. 
 157 See INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 2, at iii, 94 (disclosing that from Octo-
ber 1, 2013, through March 31, 2014, $23.5 billion in potential monetary losses to the government 
were identified as a result of misconduct); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 1(providing reference to 
the magnitude of government defense contracts and potential vulnerability of the government in the 
event of fraud). 
 158 See Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 171 (explaining whether or not knowledge can be imputed to 
the corporation depends on the individuals level or responsibility); Cont’l Oil, 706 F.2d at 1376 (ex-
plaining that an individual’s level of responsibility must be discerned from the circumstances of the 
particular case).  
 159 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 108, at 626–27 (explaining the appropriate function of damag-
es designed to penalize a defendant); see also Ellis., Jr., supra note 108, at 7 (discussing the im-
portance of balanced deterrence and the unworkable nature of excessive liability). 
 160 See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 143, at 291 (explaining that corporate vicarious liability 
imposes the harshest sanctions irrespective of the policing efforts of the corporation, thus skewing 
corporate incentives in contracting and compliance). 
 161 See id. 
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grand operations.162 Where contractors implement oversight measures and incur 
huge costs, yet are still subject to crippling vicarious liability risk, the market for 
government defense contracts becomes particularly unappealing.163 To avoid 
these negative consequences of excessive vicarious liability risk, the Act’s civil 
liability provision should be interpreted to limit prime contractor vicarious liabil-
ity.164 Such an interpretation is the only way to ensure that risk is appropriately 
apportioned and stability is maintained in government defense contracting.165  
CONCLUSION 
The textual ambiguity and inconclusive legislative history of the Anti-
Kickback Act’s civil liability provision requires that the provision be interpreted 
and applied in light the Act’s stated purpose and goals. Analysis of the Act’s 
three main goals reveals that courts should interpret the civil liability provision 
to limit vicarious liability damages to the amount of the kickback involved. This 
interpretation best promotes the Act’s goals by appropriately deterring kick-
backs, adequately compensating the government, maintaining efficiency through 
subcontractor selection, and imposing manageable levels of risk on prime con-
tractors and the government. A differing interpretation of the civil liability provi-
sion—expanding vicarious liability—would create substantial risks and seriously 
undermine the strength and purpose of the statute. Therefore, prime contractor 
vicarious liability should be limited under the Anti-Kickback Act to protect the 
government’s interest and preserve the market for government defense contracts. 
BRYAN C. CURRAN 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See WALKER, supra note 10, at 1 (valuing Department of Defense spending at $619 billion in 
2013); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 1 (exemplifying the ongoing nature of defense contracts). 
 163 See KBR II, 727 F.3d at 348 (applying increased vicarious liability measures irrespective of 
any oversight or compliance measures implemented by the prime contractor); see also Press Release, 
U.S Attorney’s Office: D.C., supra note 146 (announcing a conviction without mitigating the punish-
ment based on corporate regulatory and self-policing measures). 
 164 41 U.S.C. § 8706 (2012); see Laufer & Strudler, supra note 144, at 1296 (explaining corpora-
tions and the acceptance of limited vicarious liability risk); Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle 
and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 53, 73–74 (2007). Because corporations are already subject to costly market pressures, 
they often cannot survive a conviction for excessively high damages. See Bharara, supra at 73–74. 
Furthermore, even if a corporate defendant is not convicted, the costs of litigating in the face of possi-
bly excessively high damages drains the corporation of its resources. See id. 
 165 See 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1); H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 6 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5963. 
  
 
